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While there has been extensive work on the effect of teachers, school quality, and 
competition on pupil achievement, little is known about the effect of pupils’ beliefs 
and pupils’ strategic behaviour in the classroom on educational achievement. Do 
pupils hold different beliefs about male or female teachers, teachers of different 
ethnic  backgrounds,  teachers  of  different  subjects?  Is  pupil  effort  driven  by 
(potentially  incorrect)  beliefs  on  the  rewards  of  effort?  Understanding  students' 
assumptions  about  teachers’  behaviour  helps  to  design  policies  that  tackle  the 
problem of underachievement at school, as well as policies that address the gender 
and ethnic gap in education. 
 
This study presents the results of an experiment that involved about 1,200 grade 8 
pupils  across  29  schools  in  London,  Manchester,  and  Liverpool.  The  experiment 
provides  students  with  economic  incentives  in  the  classroom  to  estimate  how 
students’ beliefs are affected by grading conditions. We rely here on students' actual 
choices rather than students' subjective statements as subjective statements may 
not predictive of students' actual choices. 
 
Students are handed a sum of £4 which they can either keep or allocate part of the 
sum to bet on their own performance at a test where grading is partly discretionary. 
In a random half of the classrooms, grading is done anonymously by an external 
examiner.  In  the  other  random  half,  grading  is  done  non-anonymously  by  the 
teacher. Thus differences in students' betting behavior across the anonymous and 
non-anonymous classrooms identify the effect of grading conditions on students' 
beliefs.  Interestingly  the  experiment  involved  students  and  teachers  of  different 
ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status. Also, we can see whether students' 
betting  behavior  is  consistent  with  teachers'  grading  practices  compared  to  the 
external examiner's grading practices. The study shows that pupils’ perceptions are on average in line with teachers’ actual 
behavior.  But  there  are  interesting  findings  depending  on  teacher  and  student 
gender. 
 
We find that the most important effects come from the interplay between student 
and teacher  gender.  Male  students  tend  to  bet  less  when assessed by  a  female 
teacher than by an external examiner or by a male teacher. This is consistent with 
female  teachers'  grading  practices;  female  teachers  give  lower  grades  to  male 
students. Female students bet more when assessed by a male teacher than when 
assessed by an external examiner or a female teacher. Female students' behavior is 
not consistent with male teachers' grading practices, since male teachers tend to 
reward male students more than female students. 
 
The  fact  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  students'  beliefs  depend  on  ethnicity  or 
socioeconomic status is surprising given the large amount of literature on ethnicity, 
discrimination, and perceptions of discrimination. While the study has significant 
statistical power, we are not claiming that these effects do not exist - simply that we 
did not find significant evidence of them. 
 
The gender results show that students' beliefs tend to increase the gender gap in 
investment  and  effort.  A  male  teacher  increases  the  effort  and  investment  of  a 
female student. A female teacher tends to lower the effort and investment of male 
students. 
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  1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature studying the determinants of educational achievement. There is,
in particular, an interest in the factors which foster racial, ethnic, or gender gaps in education.
Most studies focus on the eﬀectiveness of educational inputs such as teacher quality (Rockoﬀ 2004,
Hanushek & Rivkin 2006), peer eﬀects (Epple & Romano 2010, Black, Devereux & Salvanes 2009),
or parental characteristics (Black et al. 2009). A number of these inputs have a signiﬁcant impact
on student achievement. Yet, student eﬀort also impacts achievement, and eﬀort may respond
strategically to educational inputs. For instance, Fryer & Torelli (2010) and Akerlof & Kranton
(2000) suggest that students’ behavior responds to a change in peer group characteristics1 in a
way that impacts educational achievement. And students’ behavior may also respond to teacher
characteristics. In psychology, the stereotype threat literature (Steele 1997, Steele & Aronson 1995)
argues that female and minority students’ fear that teachers’ judgments will conﬁrm racial or gender
stereotypes may lead to lower performance.
Unfortunately, little economics research exists to document students’ perceptions of teachers
and the eﬀect of these perceptions on eﬀort and achievement. Recent literature on teacher’s grading
practices has found consistent, even if sometimes small, biases along the lines of gender, race, and
ethnicity. Lavy (2008) ﬁnds that in Israel, male students are systematically given lower grades in
all ﬁelds when graded non anonymously at the high-school matriculation exam and ﬁnds that these
results are sensitive to the gender of the teacher. Dee (2007) also found that teachers give better
grades to students of their own gender. In England, Gibbons & Chevalier (2007), using adminis-
trative data that includes a broad range of student characteristics but not teacher characteristics,
found teacher biases depending on race and gender. In India, using an experimental design which
randomly assigns exam contents to student characteristics, and where success at the exam is tied to
ﬁnancial rewards, Hanna & Linden (2009) ﬁnds that lower caste students get lower grades and thus
lower rewards. In Sweden, Hinnerich, Hoglin & Johanneson (2011) also estimated teacher biases in
grading using an experimental design and found signiﬁcant teacher biases by student ethnicity but
not by student gender.
Students also express a belief in teacher biases in subjective survey data. In the United States,
1Fryer & Torelli (2010) suggests that, for minority students only, higher grades have a causal negative impact on
the number of friendships. Akerlof & Kranton (2002) shows that group identity aﬀects student eﬀort.
2the educational literature has looked at students’ subjective questionnaire answers on teacher biases
(for instance, Wayman (2002)). There is, however, widespread skepticism in economics as to what
subjective survey data identiﬁes (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001), skepticism which is somehow
stronger when looking at subjective survey data on perceptions of racial or gender biases (Antecol
& Kuhn 2000, Antecol & Cobb-Clark 2008).
This paper designs and implements a large scale experiment in the classroom, with monetary
incentives, across 29 English schools with 1,200 grade 8 students, to estimate how students perceive
their teacher’s grading practices. In the experiment we gave students a substantial monetary en-
dowment, and asked how much of their endowment they would like to devote to a written test. The
money that is not devoted to the test is kept by the student. The money devoted to the test can
double if all test answers are right, but the payoﬀ is lower than the initial endowment if more than
half of the answers are wrong. Interestingly, the teacher’s grading practice can be partly discre-
tionary, as these exam questions do not have a formally right or wrong answer. We then compare
the amount of the endowment devoted to the test when students know that they will be graded non
anonymously by their teacher, and when students know that they will be graded anonymously by
an external examiner. Students and teachers are fully aware of the structure of the experiment, i.e.
there is no deception involved (Davis & Holt 1993). The experiment was carried out in controlled
conditions – no interactions between students, large classroom, scripted experimental instructions
– in the classroom with students and their usual teacher, close to the deﬁnition of an artefactual
experiment (Levitt & List 2009). Importantly, the set of students taking part in the experiment
reﬂects the overall composition of the student population in England.
Our results suggest a strong gender eﬀect: male students tend to invest less when graded by a
female teacher than the anonymous examiner, and female students tend to invest more when graded
by a male teacher than when graded by anonymous external examiners. This suggests that students
believe that there are teacher biases in grading practices. Male students anticipate tougher grading
from a female teacher, and reduce their investment when graded by a female teacher. Conversely,
female students seem to anticipate more lenient grading when the teacher is male and increase their
investment accordingly. Also, teachers gave better grades to students of their own gender. Hence,
male students’ choices are consistent with female teachers’ grading practice, but female students’
choices are not consistent with male teachers’ grading practices. Interestingly, there is no signiﬁcant
3eﬀect of ethnicity and/or of socioeconomic status on students’ perceptions of teachers’ grading.
This experiment adds to the large number of studies using the methodology of laboratory ex-
periment in the ﬁeld (Harrison & List 2004) . The number of ﬁeld experiments is expanding partic-
ularly fast in the economics of education (Bettinger & Slonim 2006, Bettinger & Slonim 2007, Hoﬀ
& Pandey 2006, Fryer 2010) as classrooms provide a convenient setting where conditions can be
controlled while preserving external validity.
Our experimental design takes the form of a variant of the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut &
McCabe 1995) in the classroom. In the trust game, a truster can decide to send money to a
trustee. The amount sent is multiplied by some factor, and the trustee can chose to send back
everything, nothing or any amount in between back to the truster. The trust game has been used
to measure trust and perceptions of trustworthiness in diﬀerent social contexts (Bohnet, Greig,
Herrmann & Zeckhauser 2008, Bohnet & Zeckhauser 2004). Experiments using trust games have also
been speciﬁcally designed to estimate individuals’ perceptions of discrimination and discriminatory
behavior, for instance in Israel (Fershtman & Gneezy 2001). A key diﬀerence between this paper’s
experiment and a trust game is that, in line with usual grading situations, we removed any teachers’
monetary incentives to diminish the rewards of the students.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design, the additional
administrative data, the internal validity of the experiment, and presents descriptive statistics on
students’ choices and payoﬀs in the experiment. Section 3 estimates the eﬀect of the non anonymous
condition on student choices, by teacher and student gender, and by socioeconomic status & eth-
nicity. We estimate students’ subjective probability of success at the test by estimating a structural
expected utility model on our experimental data. The section also describes teachers’ actual grad-
ing practices and comparesthese with students’ perceptions of teachers’ grading practices. Section
7 discusses the internal and external validity of the experiment, the importance of non monetary
incentives. Section 8 concludes by discussing the policy implications of our results.
2 Experimental Design
We design a 90-minute experiment that comprises of two sessions and a questionnaire: A ﬁrst session,
where students know that they will be graded anonymously by the external examiner. A second
4session, where a random half of the students know that they will be graded non anonymously by
their teacher and another random half of the students know that they will be graded anonymously
by the external examiner. After these two sessions, students ﬁll a survey questionnaire.
2.1 Background Information
Around 1,200 grade 8 students across 29 schools in London, Manchester and Liverpool took part in
the experiment. Students and schools came from all parts of the ability distribution. Participating
schools had a wide variety of achievement levels and a wide variety of social backgrounds. In England
a common measure of achievement in secondary education is the number of ﬁve or more GCSEs
(General Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education) with grades from A to C, called ’good’ GCSEs. The
highest performing school was an all-girls Church of England school which had 75% of students
with ﬁve or more GCSEs grade C or above. The median school was a mixed community school,
with 54% of students having ﬁve or more good GCSEs. Finally, the lowest performing school was
a mixed community school, which had 38% of students with ﬁve or more good GCSEs.
Table 1 shows that the demographic composition of our schools does not strongly diﬀer from the
characteristics of the English student population. Our schools have more ethnic diversity than the
average English secondary school, and have slightly lower achievement. This is due to the number
of schools in the London area. There are about 194 grade 8 students on average in our schools,
which is a slightly lower number of grade 8 students than in the overall population. We have 13%
of free meal students in our experiment, compared to 17% of free meal students in the population
of English students. We have fewer White students in our sample than in the population of English
students (64% versus 84%), and slightly more male students in the sample than in the grade 8
population (54% versus 51%). Overall achievement scores at grade 6 national examinations (also
known as Key Stage 2 in England) are slightly lower than the national average.
2.2 The First Session
Prior to the experiment, parents sign a parental agreement2 that clearly spells out the conditions
of the experiment, including the use of monetary incentives. Head teachers and teachers agree with
the format of the experiment.
2Only one out of 1,200 students’ family refused to sign the agreement.
5We go to each school with four experts in education. Two experts are presenters, and two experts
are anonymous external graders. The presenters are recruited from a larger set of former principals,
inspectors, or teachers and are speciﬁcally trained to present the experiment to students in the
same way in each classroom. We ﬂip one coin to randomize the allocation of external examiners to
classrooms and one coin to randomize the allocation of presenters to classrooms. Presenters do not
grade and graders do not present.
The experiment proceeds as follows. In each school, we work with two classes of approximately
20 students. The experiment starts and ends at the same time in both classrooms. The experiment
takes place in large classrooms. The teacher of the classroom is present from the beginning of each
experiment, but keeps silent. The teacher is either the main teacher of the grade or the English
teacher. Before entering the classroom, students are handed a table number. They then enter the
classroom in silence and sit at the table corresponding to their number. Students are only identiﬁed
by their number and never by their name – thus the experimental procedure is anonymous. Numbers
are assigned randomly so that students are not able to choose where they want to sit. This limits the
potential for cheating and peer eﬀects. Sealed envelopes containing the questions and the answer
sheets are on each table.
A presenter, in each classroom, reads the experimental instructions aloud. The timeline pre-
sented in the appendix (page 38) is strictly followed. The experiment is about deﬁning words
presented in a paragraph that contains the word. An example question, “archaeologist”, is then
read aloud by the presenter. A few students provide potential answers, and the presenter does not
say which answer is better than the others. Each question is a word deﬁnition, as in the previous
example.
We purposedly chose a task, deﬁning words, where there is no formal right or wrong answer.
This potentially gives teachers the possibility of adopting diﬀerent grading practices with diﬀerent
students. Choosing a task where grading practices depend on the teacher is critical for the study
of students’ behaviour whenpotentially facing a teacher bias. In practice, we observe that word
deﬁnitions are graded diﬀerently by diﬀerent graders. Indeed, a grader can, for instance, choose
to give the point to students who give the deﬁnition that is consistent with the context only.
For instance, “demonstration” has two diﬀerent meanings, depending on the context. The word
“demonstration” is presented in a paragraph where it means “a public meeting or a march protesting
6against something.” Graders decide in each case whether the acceptable answer should be consistent
with the context. We do not provide guidelines. Graders can require deﬁnitions that are full
sentences, graders can also sanction deﬁnitions based on examples, such as examples of “species”
rather than a deﬁnition of “species.”
The presenter then tells students that he will give them £2. Students are able to keep this
endowment or students can choose to buy questions at a cost of 20p each.
A right answer leads to a gain of 40p, whereas a wrong answer leads to no money. There are
10 potential questions, so that a student can get up to £4. Students do not know the questions
ex-ante, and cannot choose which questions they want to answer. The presenter describes a couple
of scenarios, e.g. the student chooses to buy 4 questions, gets 3 questions right. The presenter asks
students to calculate how much they would get. The payoﬀ is 2 40:20+30:40 = 2:40 pounds.
Thus the presenter makes sure that students understand the game. The payoﬀ of a student who
buys n questions and gets k  n answers right is:
c(n;k) = 2   0:20  n + 0:40  k
Finally, students then choose the number of bought questions by circling a number between 0 and
10 at the bottom of the envelope. Students are informed that this choice cannot be changed later
on.
How many questions do you want to buy?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Once the number of questions to buy has been circled, students open the envelope containing
the answer sheet. They have 20 minutes to write down in silence their deﬁnitions. Students answer
questions 1 to 4 if they chose 4 questions. They cannot choose the speciﬁc questions to answer.
We chose a reasonably long duration of 20 min to ensure that students do not need to consider
a time constraint when making their choices.
The words are taken from all subjects, from science, geography, history, and English.3Also, the
3When we carried out the experiment, the words were species, monologue, ridge, gravity, paranoia, eroded,
unemployment, recycling, demonstrations, tax. These words come the last ten years of English national examinations
(Key Stage 3).
7design is such that both diﬃcult and easy questions are present.4 In some cases of students with
special educational needs, an adult reads the text – but not any answer – quietly to the student.
Envelopes are then collected and given to the anonymous external marker. This completes the
ﬁrst round.
It is important to stress that no feedback is given at the end of the ﬁrst round. Feedback on
outcomes is only provided at the end of the second round, once students have left the classroom.
Payoﬀs are handed at the end of the experiment for all students, regardless of their choices, to avoid
diﬀerences in choices due to impatience (Bettinger & Slonim 2007).
2.3 The Second Session
Students are then told that there will be a second round, with the same guidelines, and a diﬀerent
set of questions. Each student gets a new envelope and a new endowment. In one randomly
selected classroom, the “treatment” classroom, students are told that answers will be corrected by
their teacher. In that classroom, students write their name and their teacher’s name at the top of
envelope. The rest of the session then proceeds as before: students choose a number of questions
from 0 to 10, and then have 20 minutes to ﬁll in the answer sheet. Words of the second round are
diﬀerent than words of the ﬁrst round.5
Envelopes are collected. Students leave the classroom and keep the paper bearing their table
number. Envelopes are given either to the teacher or the external examiner, who corrects them.
The presenter calculates the payoﬀs, ﬁlls envelopes with the monetary payoﬀs. Envelopes bear the
student’s number. Envelopes are handed to the student. This completes the second round.
To summarize, students of the treatment classroom are in the nonanonymous condition in the
second round, and students of the control classroom are in the anonymous condition in the second
round.
Anonymous Condition Grading is performed by an external examiner who does not see the
student or his/her name. Students are identiﬁed only by their table number.
4For instance, monologue was an especially diﬃcult word (with a low success rate), gravity was a particularly easy
one (with a very high success rate), paranoia was diﬃcult, unemployment and recycling were easy, demonstrations
was diﬃcult (in the context of the excerpt), and tax was found to be moderately diﬃcult.
5The words were customary, stone’s throw, wrestling, earthquake, single, charisma, ﬁctional character, legacy,
rhyme, curfew.
8Non anonymous Condition Students write their name and their teacher’s name on the en-
velope and answers are corrected by the teacher.
And in the ﬁrst round, students are always in the anonymous condition.
Control Classroom Treatment Classroom
Round 1 Anonymous Condition Anonymous Condition
Round 2 Anonymous Condition Non anonymous Condition
Both classrooms start and end the experiment at the same time, which prevents contamination
of the control by the treatment.
We observe each student’s choice and outcome twice. In the treatment classroom, we observe
students’ choice and outcome once in the anonymous setting, and once in the non anonymous
setting. In the control classroom, we observe students’ choice and outcome twice in the anonymous
setting.
2.4 Complementary Data: Survey Questionnaire, Administrative Data and
Teachers’ and External Examiners’ Grading
At the end of the second round, students ﬁll a survey questionnaire after the second round, and
before envelopes are handed, hence payoﬀs do not aﬀect answers to the questionnaire.6 Questions
of the survey questionnaire assess students’ stated perceptions of the role of hard work, luck, their
perceptions of the teacher’s fairness, whether diﬀerent ethnicities have equal opportunities, and
whether they feel that their eﬀort at school is not rewarded. We also ask students how they perceive
their own ability, and how much weekly pocket money they get. The average weekly pocket money
we estimated using our data was close to the average amount from a survey by Halifax Bank7.
Only a small number of students reported weekly pocket money conditional on good behavior or
conditional on participation in the duties of the house – cleaning their room, washing the dishes,
etc. 8
6Because of experimental constraints, half of the students ﬁlled the survey questionnaire.
7Halifax Pocket Money Survey 2008, available at http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/media/pdfs/halifax/2008/
August/25_08_08_Halifax_pocket_money_survey_2008.pdf .
8Presenters also lead a discussion about students’ feelings about the experiment; whether they enjoyed it, what
they felt the purpose of the experiment was. students said they enjoyed the game, the presence of monetary rewards;
9We merge the experimental results with administrative data on students, from the English
National Pupil Database.9 As a requirement to participate to the study, every school gave an
agreement to provide the name and the national unique pupil number of the students participating
to the experiment. In practice, 85% of schools provided us with a complete list of the names and
numbers of the students. We are able to match those students to their test score on national
examinations in 2009, just one year before the experiment, and to get their ethnicity, gender, free
meal status. When the data is not available, we code ethnicity and gender through classroom
observation and names. For ethnicity, we break down the sample into white students and nonwhite
students; and also into narrower categories: White, Asian, Black, Mixed, or Other. The free meal
status is given to students whose parents or carers are on income-based job seeker’s allowance,
income support, and other welfare beneﬁts. It is a proxy for economic deprivation which comprises
about 17% of the student population.
Finally, students’ answers and teachers’ grades were coded question by question, for each round
and in each condition, so that the ﬁnal ﬁle includes the whole sequence of right and wrong answers.
2.5 Descriptive statistics
Students’ choices are summarized in Table 3. Over the two rounds, students choose an average of
6.3 questions, with a standard deviation of 3.2.Students with higher prior grade 6 test scores bought
more questions. A 1 standard deviation increase in prior standardized score increases the number of
questions bought by 0.5 in the ﬁrst round and by 0.8 in the second round. The correlation between
prior score and the number of questions is signiﬁcantly stronger in the second round.
On average, students had 3.57 good answers, representing a success rate of 54%. Thus the
questions are neither too easy, nor too hard. Students get in the envelope an average of £4.33.
They earn a bit more than if they had not bought any question. Thus if students were risk neutral
and success rate did not depend on the number of questions chosen, students should actually have
bought 10 questions in each session Table 3 shows the distribution of payoﬀs in the ﬁrst and the
second round.
our most signiﬁcant ﬁnding is that the presence of monetary rewards made most students interested in understanding
and deﬁning words, including students who would not otherwise be easily motivated. Students declared that deﬁning
words was neither too easy nor too hard.
9This database is central in most papers estimating school quality in England, see for instance Machin & McNally
(2005) and Kramarz, Machin & Ouazad (2010).
103 Results
3.1 Students’ Perception of Teachers’ Grading Practices:
Identiﬁcation Strategy
To identify the eﬀect of the non anonymous condition on students’ perceptions of teachers’ grading
practices, we study how their choice of investment (number of questions bought) vary between the
anonymous and the non anonymous condition (deﬁned in section 2.3 on page 8). Students are
graded in the non anonymous condition in the second round of the treatment classroom only, hence
the 2-round design of our experiment allows us to get a within-student estimate of the treatment
eﬀect. The eﬀect is estimated by comparing the change in the number of questions chosen in the
ﬁrst and the second round in the treatment and in the control group. A within-student estimate
leads to more precise estimates than an estimate relying on one round of observation.
This amounts to estimating the following regression:10
Questionsi;t = constant +   Round 2i;t +   Treatmenti;t
+  Round 2  Treatmenti;t (1)
+ui + "i;t
Questionsi;t is the number of questions bought by student i in round t = 1;2. The coeﬃcient
of interest is , the eﬀect of the non anonymous condition on the number of questions bought.
Because the treatment is randomly assigned (see section 4.1 on page 18), we can model ui as a
random eﬀect. The random eﬀects estimator is a more eﬃcient estimator than the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimator. Estimation with ﬁxed eﬀects conﬁrms that the results are robust to the use of ﬁxed
eﬀects.  controls for the diﬀerence in average behavior between the second and the ﬁrst round, a
diﬀerence which is partly due to students experiencing the ﬁrst round and learning about the task.
Interestingly,  also controls for learning when students of diﬀerent characteristics learn diﬀerently.11
10Results based on a Poisson count data model right-censored at 10 with student ﬁxed eﬀects yield very similar
results.
11To see that, assume that  = a + ai, where E(ai) = 0, and a is a constant. ai is the student-speciﬁc learning
control, with E(ai) = 0. Then the residual is i;t = "i;t +aiRound 2i;t. Algebra shows that the randomization of the
treatment ensures that Treatmenti;t and Round 2 Treatmenti;t are independent of i;t. Hence the treatment eﬀect
 is consistently estimated by OLS.
11The average eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (0.035 with a standard error of 0.15),
which suggests that students do not make wild assumptions on the behavior of the external grader
compared to their teacher. More interestingly, the non signiﬁcant average eﬀect masks considerable
variation in the way students of diﬀerent characteristics have responded to the non anonymous
condition. We estimate equation 1 on diﬀerent subsamples deﬁned by the teacher’s and student’s
gender, the student’s ethnicity and free meal status.
3.2 Perceptions by Student Gender
Student gender has been shown to be one of the key variable aﬀecting the grading practices of
teachers in the previous literature. Our results indicate that students do form beliefs over teachers’
leniency/toughness in grading, beliefs which diﬀer according to their own gender and the gender of
their teacher.
Eﬀects by teacher and student gender are presented in Table 4. Each cell is a separate regression
according to baseline speciﬁcation 1.12 When graded by a male teacher, female students tended to
buy 0.843 more question when graded by the teacher than when graded by the external examiner.
The treatment eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%. When graded by a female teacher, male
students tended to buy 0.601 less question than when graded by the external examiner. Overall,
since the number of female teachers was higher than the number of male teachers, students graded
by a male teacher bought signiﬁcantly more questions in the non anonymous condition than in the
anonymous condition (+0.576).
3.3 Perceptions by Parental Income and by Student Ethnicity
A key question is whether students from diﬀerent ethnic and social backgrounds perceive teacher
biases against their group. This question is particularly relevant for ethnic minorities and students
from low social backgrounds. A negative perception of their teachers could cause a lower investment
in the education process and deepen inequalities in educational achievement.
To test for an eﬀect of students’ socio-economic background on students’ perceptions, we use
students’ free school meal eligibility. Free meal eligibility is based on parental income & recipiency
12This allows the coeﬃcient , measuring students’ ‘learning’ in-between the two rounds, to diﬀer across genders.
A single regression where the Round 2  Treatmenti;t variable is interacted with students’ and teachers’ gender has
also been carried out, yielding very similar results.
12of welfare beneﬁts and represents about 17% of the student population. It is therefore a good proxy
for poverty and deprivation. The bottom part of Table 7 estimates result for free meal and non free
meal students. As for table 4, each cell is the eﬀect of the non anonymous condition for a separate
regression. Results suggest that there is no eﬀect of poverty status on the number of questions
bought.
Table 7 also displays the same analysis for white and for nonwhite students. As mentioned in the
introduction, the stereotype threat literature (Steele & Aronson 1995, Steele 1997) ﬁnds that African
American students’ fear of conﬁrming racial stereotypes of underachievement may negatively aﬀect
their achievement. Another psychology literature suggests that even arbitrary group aﬃliation may
aﬀect the way people treat others (Tajfel 1982). We ﬁnd no such eﬀect of ethnicity on students’
choices. There is no eﬀect regardless of whether we consider the whole nonwhite category or whether
we consider a breakdown of nonwhite students by racial subgroup.13 These results are signiﬁcant
as they suggest that students from all diﬀerent ethnic background believe that they have equal
chances in the educational system in England. This is conﬁrmed in the answers from the survey
questionnaire. When answering the question “Do you think that pupils with the same ability
but diﬀerent ethnicities are equally likely to succeed at school”, students from ethnic minorities
overwhelmingly answered positively.
3.4 Estimating Students’ Subjective Probabilities of Success
Previous analyses found an eﬀect of the non anonymous condition on the number of questions
bought. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation allows us to estimate an average eﬀect in terms
of number of questions. Whilst the magnitude of this eﬀect is informative, it is unclear how this
diﬀerence translates in terms of beliefs. Clues as to what beliefs translate into students’ investment
choices can be found by considering that choosing a number of questions to buy between 0 and 10
is making a trade-oﬀ between risk and return.
We estimate a structural model of choice where students choose the number of question which
maximizes their utility. Doing so we are able to convert the treatment eﬀects of Table 4 into
diﬀerences in subjective probability of success with their respective teachers.
13Indian, Pakistani, Black, and Black Caribbean students have very diﬀerent achievement levels in England. We
ﬁnd no eﬀect when considering these subgroups.
13We formalize the student’s choice in an expected utility framework where students choose a
trade-oﬀ between the risk and the return of buying more questions. We assume a random utility
model where the utility of choosing n questions is:
Un = E [u(c(n;k))] + "n (2)
where k  n is the number of right answers, c(n;k) = 2   0:20  n + 0:40  k is the payoﬀ when n
questions are bought and k answers are right, u is the Von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function
deﬁned on the payoﬀ, and "n a random factor. Assuming that students form a subjective probability
^ p of getting a right answer on any question, the subjective probability of getting k answers right when








A ^ pk(1   ^ p)n k. As mentioned in section 2.2, our observation
suggests that students did not need more than 20 minutes to ﬁll the answer sheet.
The probability P(n; ^ p;r) of choosing n questions depends on his subjective probability of a
right answer ^ p and his relative risk-aversion r. E(n) =
P10
n=0 P(n; ^ p;r)  n is the average number of
questions bought for students who believe that the subjective probability of a right answer is ^ p and
r is relative risk aversion. The average number of questions bought increases when the subjective
probability 0  ^ p  1 of a right answer increases, and the number of questions bought decreases
when risk aversion r increases.
The subjective probability ^ p of a right answer depends on whether the observation belongs to
the treatment or control classroom, whether the observation is in the second round, and whether
the observation is for treatment classroom in the second round. That gives a speciﬁcation for ^ p
which is similar to the baseline speciﬁcation of equation 1. There is a diﬀerent ^ p for each round and
for the control and treatment classrooms.
^ pi;t = a + b  Round 2 + c  Treatmenti;t
+d  Round 2  Treatmenti;t (3)
To make things amenable to estimation, we assume that the utility function exhibits constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA), so that u(c) = c1 r
1 r , and r is relative risk-aversion. We estimate the
parameters ^ p;r by maximum likelihood, assuming that "n is i.i.d. extreme value distributed as in
14Andersen, Fountain, Harrison & Rutström (2010) . Fechner errors or normally distributed errors
can also be used, without signiﬁcant changes in the point estimates presented below.
Standard errors are clustered by classroom. The coeﬃcient of interest here is d, the eﬀect of the
treatment on the subjective probability of a right answer. We also parameterize risk aversion by
gender, to control for potential diﬀerences in risk attitudes by gender.
ri = constant + g  Malei
where g measures the diﬀerence in risk aversion between male and female students. Our assumption
that risk aversion is stable between the two rounds and across treatment and control is supported
by the data: A regression for a diﬀerent level of risk aversion for each round gives point estimates
that are not statistically diﬀerent.
Results are presented in Table 8. Risk aversion estimates suggest that students are risk loving,
i.e. they have negative risk aversion. Such a result is not uncommon in situations where participants
are given an endowment to play with. This is due to the so called house money eﬀect (Thaler &
Johnson 1990), the fact to play with an amount of money recently received. In our experiment,
students are not playing with their own money but rather with an endowment of £2 in each round.
The subjective probability of a right answer is estimated to be 62% (column 1) over the whole
sample. This is above the estimated success rate of 52 and 57% in the ﬁrst and second round
respectively, indicating some degree of overconﬁdence
Results also show that students have a signiﬁcantly higher subjective p when graded by a male
teacher. According to our results, students believe that a question graded by a male teacher is 6
percentage points more likely to be deemed right. Students also believe that a question graded by
a female teacher is 3.5 percentage points less likely to be deemed right. This is consistent with the
non-structural estimates of Table 4.
Our results indicate that the gender eﬀects observed in the diﬀerence in diﬀerences model can be
linked with very substantial diﬀerences in subjective beliefs. In the non anonymous condition, female
students behave as if they had an increase of 10 percentage point in their subjective probability of
success when the teacher is a male. Conversely, male students behave as if they had a 16.5 percentage
point decrease in their subjective probability of success. These results conﬁrm the signiﬁcant eﬀect
15of the non anonymous treatment on the students subjective beliefs in their chance of success. Female
students behavior suggests that they believe that their chance of success is signiﬁcantly higher with
a male teacher. Conversely, male students seem to believe that they are signiﬁcantly less likely to
succeed if the teacher is a female.
3.5 Grading Practices
We chose not to perform double grading of answer sheets in order to preserve teachers’ anonymity
and thus avoid teachers’ strategic response to double grading. However, comparing the number of
right answers across the anonymous and non anonymous condition is not appropriate if one wants to
compare grading practices across external examiners and teachers. Indeed, both grading practices
and students’ choices vary across the two conditions.
To solve this issue, we compare grades given in the two conditions, question by question, which
substantially alleviates the previous issue. The control and the treatment groups are randomly
allocated, hence comparing grading question by question across the two conditions is likely to give
us a good estimate of the teacher’s grading practice vis a vis the external examiner.
Table 9 shows pteacher, the fraction of right answers when corrected by the teacher and pexternal examiner,
the fraction of right answers when corrected by the external examiner. For the ﬁrst question, the
teacher graded the answer right in 48% of cases, and the external examiner graded the answer right
in only 39% of cases. The diﬀerence is 8 percentage points and strongly signiﬁcant.
Overall, for all questions, the teacher marked the answer right with a 6 percentage point higher
probability than the external examiner. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at 5% for several questions,
but is only signiﬁcant at 10% overall.
Previous literature on teacher biases has found a tendency for teachers to advantage female
students (Lavy 2008). To assess whether teachers’ grading practices diﬀer over diﬀerent subset
of students, we regressed the probability of a right answer on student gender, a non anonymous
condition dummy, the prior grade 6 score, and interactions between the non anonymous condition
and the prior score, and between the non anonymous condition and the teacher’s gender.
Question k Righti;round2 = constant + a  Malei + b  Non Anonymous Conditioni
+c  Grade 6 Scorei
16+d  Non Anonymous Conditioni  Grade 6 Scorei
+f  Non Anonymous Condition  Malei
+g  Non Anonymous Condition  Malei  Female Teacheri
+g  Non Anonymous Condition  Femalei  Male Teacheri + "i (4)
where, as before, i indexes students, and "i is the residual. Prior grade 6 score is broken down into
quartiles, so that Grade 6 Scorei is a set of dummies for the second, third, and fourth quartile of
prior achievement.
Table 10 presents the results for three words. Results for other words are available from the
authors and do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer. Again, students are more likely to get the answer right
when corrected in the non anonymous condition: Teachers’ likelihood of giving the point is 7 to
22 percentage points higher. And male teachers were even more lenient for words ’customary’ and
’single’, increasing this likelihood by another 8 to 16 percentage points. Male students are less likely
to get the answer right in the non anonymous condition on some questions, a ﬁnding consistent with
Lavy (2008), who ﬁnds that male students tend to get lower grades when graded non anonymously.
More able students are more likely to get the answer right, a student in the top quartile of
the grade 6 scores is from 21 to 24 percentage points more likely to get the answer right. This is
the same eﬀect in the anonymous and the non anonymous condition, revealing that teachers grade
students of diﬀerent ability levels the same way as the external examiner; the diﬀerence between
the external examiner and diﬀerent types of teachers is that teachers give higher grades on average.
All in all, results on teachers’ grading practices by gender partially match our main results,
presented in section 3. Male students’ choices are consistent with the perception of an actual bias.
In classrooms where their teacher was female, male students invested less when they knew that
the teacher would grade their paper knowing their name (the non anonymous condition). Female
students’ choices, on the other hand, are inconsistent with teachers’ actual bias. Our results suggest
that female students’ choices would be consistent with male teachers giving them higher grades,
while they actually receive higher grades from female teachers.
Overall our results conﬁrm previous studies showing that teachers grading practices vary over
diﬀerent subset of students. Our experimental design allows us to test whether in return students
17form beliefs about the existence of such diﬀerentials in grading practices.
4 Discussion
4.1 Internal Validity
A possible concern about our results is whether our randomization process was successful. In spite
of our random allocation of the treatment and presenters by coin toss, one could wonder whether we
have successfully eliminated systematic diﬀerences in students and presenters characteristics between
the treatment group and the control group. To test for this, we ﬁrst compare the characteristics
of students between the treatment and the control group, including their gender, ethnicity, and
prior grade 6 score. The results, displayed in Table 2 indicate that there is indeed no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the characteristics of the students in the treatment group and the students in
the control group.
As a second check of the internal validity of the experiment, we perform a placebo test by
noticing that there should be no treatment eﬀect in the ﬁrst round. There would be an eﬀect if
presenters or classroom eﬀects rather than teachers are driving the treatment eﬀects. The sixth row
of Table 2 shows that the number of questions chosen in the ﬁrst round is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between the control and the treatment classroom. Also the last two rows show that there is no
treatment eﬀect in the ﬁrst round in schools which, in the second round, have a male teacher in the
non anonymous condition. This indicates that the diﬀerent eﬀects observed accross teachers from
diﬀerent genders does not come from systematic diﬀerences in the characteristics of their students.14
4.2 External validity
When discussing our results, it is important to consider in what extent the eﬀect found in this
experiment can be generalised. A key question is whether the teachers participating in our experi-
ment have speciﬁc characteristics which would make them very unrepresentative of the the overall
population of male and female teachers in England. In ﬁeld experiments it is typically diﬃcult to
estimate representative parameters on a non randomly selected subpopulation.
14Also, the average diﬀerence between the treatment and the control group is the same in the ﬁrst and in the
second round.
18Several elements concur to suggest that there is no reason to doubt of the external validity
of our results. First, we have selected schools from diﬀerent regional areas with very diﬀerent
ethnic and socio-economic compositions. The selection process speciﬁcally aimed to form a sample
for which the experimental results could be used to inform the policy makers in England. The
section 2.1 describes how the selected schools have a large range of characteristics and how as a
consequence the population of students participating to the experiment does not markedly diﬀer
from the population of English pupils. Second, the eﬀect is present for every male teacher of the
sample, and the treatment eﬀect is large – above one additional question – for two teachers of the
sample. Third, male teachers are observed in very diﬀerent schools across the sample: in community
schools, voluntary aided schools, grammar schools, and specialist schools, in London, Manchester
and Liverpool.15 Fourth, teacher gender is not correlated with students’ prior achievement. The
p-value of the t-test of the equality of prior scores for students graded by a male teacher versus
students graded by a female teacher is 0.1546; the absence of such correlation is important since we
ﬁnd treatment eﬀects that depend on ability – so that the male teacher eﬀect that we ﬁnd is not
due to some correlation between prior achievement and the teacher’s gender.
Overall there is no indication that the students and teachers participating in the experiment
have characteristics unrepresentative of the population of students and teachers in England .
4.3 Gender Results by Teachers’ Subject
A possible confounding factor for our result on the eﬀect of the teachers’ gender could be that
male and female teachers in our sample tend to teach diﬀerent disciplines. Female teachers are
for instance more likely to be English teachers than male teachers. Statistically, female students
outperform male students in all disciplines, but at grade 9 (GCSE) exams, the gender gap is larger
in English, and the Humanities. As a consequence, a male student could form lower expectation
about his chances of success with an English teacher because English teachers are ‘tougher’ graders
for him than teachers of other subjects, e.g. mathematics. As a consequence, we could observe a
negative eﬀect of female teachers on boys’ investment. In this case, the subject area of the teacher
would be driving the results rather than the gender of the teacher.
The experimental data includes the subject taught by the teacher. The diﬀerent subjects are:
15We preserve the anonymity of schools in the paper.
19English, mathematics, history, humanities, business studies, information and communications tech-
nology (ICT). We estimate Table 4 on two subsets. The ﬁrst subset is made of students who are in
schools where the teacher of the non anonymous condition is an English or a Humanities teacher.
These are two subjects where the gender gap at grade 9 is higher than the gender gap in the
other subjects. The second subset is made of students who are in schools where the teacher of the
treatment classroom is a mathematics, business studies, or ICT teacher.
Results for the subset of English teachers and humanities teachers are shown in Table 5. Results
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the results for the overall sample reported in Table 4, and are, if
anything, stronger. The eﬀect of the nonanonymous condition for male students graded by a female
teacher is -1.202 questions. The eﬀect of the nonanonymous condition for female students graded
by a male teacher is 1.469 questions. Interestingly, in Table 6, where the eﬀect is estimated on
mathematics, business studies, or ICT teachers, gender interaction eﬀects are not signiﬁcant.
4.4 Monetary versus Non monetary Incentives
A key assumption to link our results to students’ diﬀerences in perceptions of their teachers grading
practices is that the monetary payoﬀs of the game was the main motivation of students’ choices.
However, one could wonder whether non monetary incentives could play a key role in students’
choices. A student may want to please or impress the presenter (Levitt & List 2007), please the
teacher relatively more than the presenter, signal his/her ability (Feltovitch & Harbaugh 2002),
signal hard work or conform to group norms when graded by the teacher (Austen-Smith & Fryer
2005). Several elements indicates that such non monetary incentives are unlikely to be driving the
results.
First, the monetary incentives given in the experiment are substantial for 13 year old students.
Students can earn up to £8, which represents 1.25 times students’ average weekly pocket money
(around £6), and represents around a third of the weekly disability living allowance in the U.K.16.
In 2003, 2.5 million individuals in the U.K. were receiving the disability living allowance, which
is partly a substitute for unemployment beneﬁts (Benitez-Silva, Disney & Jimenez-Martin 2010).
From our personal experience and the feedback we received from students, the prospect to win real
16Source: UK government’s digital service for people in England and Wales accessible at
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/disabledpeople/ﬁnancialsupport/dg_10011925.
20money was a key motivator for students and it prompted them to think carefully about the best
option to maximize their payoﬀs.
Second, it must be stressed that non monetary incentives in themselves would not necessarily
biasing the results. If some students have a desire to please the presenter similar to the one to
please the teacher, the randomness of the assignment to the treatment and control, and the within-
student design control for this. Non monetary incentives could naturally be stronger in the second
round when students are marked by their teachers, but even in this situations, these non monetary
incentives bias our results only if they are systematically diﬀerent over diﬀerent subgroup of students.
If they tend to be the same for all students, they should be averaged out in the diﬀerence in
diﬀerences estimation due to the random allocation of students.
Third, to check for the possibility that diﬀerent subset of students may have diﬀerent level of non
monetary incentives, we use the answers from the post experiment survey. The survey includes a
question about the desire of the student to value the relationship with the teacher independently of
the monetary incentives of the experiment : “A good relationship with the teacher matters (Strongly
Disagree... to Strongly Agree).” To see whether the answer to this question is correlated with the
eﬀect of the non anonymous condition for female students when graded by male teachers, we proceed
in the following way. We focused on the sample of female students in schools where the teacher
was male, and, for each question, we split the sample into two parts. Students whose answer
is below the median answer (they disagree more than the median student), and students whose
answer is above the median answer (they agree more than the median student). We then estimated
the treatment eﬀect for those two subgroups, question by question. The results are presented in
Table 11. Remarkably, the treatment does not diﬀer by the answer to the survey questionnaire,
and treatment eﬀects are still signiﬁcant and positive for each subgroup. This indicates that the
expressed diﬀerences in the belief that a good relationship with the teacher matters did not drive
the observed diﬀerences in number of question chosen by female students.
5 Conclusion
Using a deception-free incentive-compatible experimental design in 29 English schools with 1,200
students, we estimated the eﬀect of students’ perceptions of teacher biases on student investment
21in the classroom. Our results suggest that students from low-income families and minority ethnic
backgrounds do not believe in systematic teacher biases. This result is signiﬁcant given that in
some countries, including the United States, studies have found that minority students state beliefs
in detrimental teacher biases (Wayman 2002). Our result may either indicate that such biases do
not exist to the same extent as in England, or that our experiment gives us a better indication
of students’ underlying beliefs than traditional survey questionnaires. Unlike surveys, our design
provides students with monetary incentives to reveal their beliefs.
Previous economics of education literature on teacher biases suggests that in some contexts
teachers give better grades to students of their own gender (Dee 2007). We ﬁnd that students’
perceptions strongly depend on their gender and their teacher’s gender. Male students invest less
when graded by a female teacher, and female students invest more when graded by a male teacher.
These results imply that male students have lower expectations about their chances of success when
graded by a female teacher while female students have higher expectations about their chances of
success when graded by a male teacher. Interestingly, an analysis of teachers’ grading practices
shows that these belief only partially match teachers’ actual behavior. Indeed, teachers are more
lenient with students of their own gender. Male students’ choices are in line with the fact that male
teachers give them lower grades, but female students’ choices are not consistent with male teachers’
grading practice.
A breakdown by teachers’ subjects reveals that gender interaction eﬀects are driven by the
subset of English and Humanities teachers, and that there is little eﬀect for other subjects, i.e.
mathematics, business studies, and ICT. Interestingly, gender gaps in achievement at school are
much stronger in English and the Humanities. Indeed, in virtually all ﬁelds, including mathematics
and science, girls outperform boys at GCSE examinations,17 i.e. a higher fraction of girls achieve 5
A-C GCSEs, so-called ‘good GCSEs’. At grade 2 and grade 6 national examinations (Key Stages
1 and 2), girls signiﬁcantly outperform boys in English, but boys are only slightly ahead of girls in
mathematics (Machin & McNally 2005). All in all, our results are consistent with the possibility
that gender interactions play a stronger role in English and the Humanities classes, and shape
educational outcomes more strongly.
Overall, results shed new light on the nature of gender interactions in the classroom. Students’
17General Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education (GCSE) are taken in grade 9.
22responses to teachers’ characteristics are an important determinant of their eﬀort, all the more
that students’ actions need not be consistent with teachers’ actions and perceptions. Importantly,
the two eﬀects we ﬁnd go in the same direction: they both increase the gender gap in student
investment; Indeed, with a male teacher, the gap between boys’ and girls’ eﬀort increases because
girls invest more; with a female teacher, the gap increases because boys invest less.
The growing gender gap in education has become a concern for policy makers (Weaver-Hightower
2003). Further research may help explain what shapes students’ perceptions, whether and how mis-
perceptions can be corrected, and how much these perceptions aﬀect student eﬀort and investment
in other contexts.
23Bertrand, M. & Mullainathan, S. (2001), ‘Do people mean what they say?’, American Economic
Review 91(2), 67–72.
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27Table 2: Randomization of the Treatment
Treatment group Control group p-value of the diﬀerence
Randomization
Free school meal 0.512 0.547 0.618
(0.02) (0.02)
[597] [557]
Key Stage 2 score 87.27 86.46 0.361
(0.63) (0.63)
[597] [557]
White 0.682 0.659 0.524
(0.02) (0.03)
[597] [557]
Male 0.513 0.547 0.352
(0.02) (0.02)
[597] [557]




Questions Bought 6.46 6.33 0.453
in 1st Round (0.12) (0.12)
[597] [557]
Questions Bought in 1st Round, 6.37 6.21 0.564
School with Male Teacher in 2nd Round (0.21) (0.20)
[225] [204]
Questions Bought in 1st Round, 6.30 6.60 0.160
School with Female Teacher in 2nd Round (0.157) (0.146)
[225] [204]
Conﬁdence intervals in parenthesis. Number of observations in brackets.
28Table 3: Choices and Outcomes
Mean S.D. Min Max
First Round
Questions Purchased 6.39 2.93 0.00 10.00
Good answers 3.43 2.32 0.00 10.00
Fraction Right 0.52 0.23 0.00 1.00
Payoﬀ (£) 2.09 0.59 0.00 4.00
Second Round
Questions Purchased 6.25 3.45 0.00 10.00
Good answers 3.73 2.70 0.00 10.00
Fraction Right 0.57 0.26 0.00 1.00
Payoﬀ (£) 2.24 0.66 0.00 4.00
29Table 4: Main Result – Eﬀect of Non anonymous Grading by the Teacher by Teacher and Student
Gender
Teachers
Students All Male Female  = Male   Female
All 0.036 0.576 -0.318 0.894
( 0.150 ) ( 0.233 )** ( 0.197 ) ( 0.297 )**
Observations 2,292 856 1,396 2,292
Male -0.086 0.487 -0.601 1.088
( 0.232 ) ( 0.312 ) ( 0.268 )** (0.446)**
Observations 1,031 486 801 1,031
Female 0.359 0.843 0.110 0.733
( 0.230 ) ( 0.371 )** ( 0.268 ) (0.413)*
Observations 873 278 595 873
Each coeﬃcient comes from a separate regression for the treatment eﬀect on each subsample.
Reading: Being graded by the teacher increases the number of questions bought by 0.036 question. Being graded by
a male teacher increases the number of questions bought by 0.576 question.
***: Signiﬁcant at 1%. **: Signiﬁcant at 5%. *: Signiﬁcant at 10%.
This table reports the eﬀect of the non anonymous condition for each group of students and each group of teachers.
Coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst ﬁve rows are the coeﬃcients of separate regressions questionsi;t = Round 2i;t +Round 2
Treatmenti;t + ui + "i;t.
30Table 5: Main Result – Eﬀect of Non anonymous Grading by the Teacher by Teacher and Student
Gender – For English & Humanities Teachers
Teachers
Students All Male Female  = Male   Female
All 0.041 0.844 -0.403 1.247
( 0.231 ) ( 0.287 )*** ( 0.318 ) (0.462)**
Observations 811 285 526 811
Male -0.163 0.473 -1.202 1.675
( 0.345 ) ( 0.341 ) ( 0.553 )** (0.682)**
Observations 402 169 233 402
Female 0.686 1.469 0.379 1.090
( 0.282 )** ( 0.499 )*** ( 0.553 ) (0.606)*
Observations 405 112 293 405
Each coeﬃcient comes from a separate regression for the treatment eﬀect on each subsample.
Reading: Being graded by the teacher increases the number of questions bought by 0.036 question. Being graded by
a male teacher increases the number of questions bought by 0.576 question.
***: Signiﬁcant at 1%. **: Signiﬁcant at 5%. *: Signiﬁcant at 10%.
This table reports the eﬀect of the non anonymous condition for each group of students and each group of teachers.
Coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst ﬁve rows are the coeﬃcients of separate regressions questionsi;t = Round 2i;t +Round 2
Treatmenti;t + ui + "i;t.
31Table 6: Main Result – Eﬀect of Non anonymous Grading by the Teacher by Teacher and Student
Gender – Teachers of Mathematics, Business Studies, Information and Computer Technology
Teachers
Students All Male Female  = Male   Female
All 0.048 0.437 -0.251 0.688
( 0.195 ) ( 0.319 ) ( 0.251 ) (0.460)
Observations 1,481 571 870 1,481
Male -0.038 0.488 -0.319 0.807
( 0.306 ) ( 0.442 ) ( 0.299 ) (0.462)
Observations 671 317 568 671
Female 0.110 0.446 -0.124 0.570
( 0.352 ) ( 0.518 ) ( 0.299 ) (0.698)
Observations 468 166 302 468
Each coeﬃcient comes from a separate regression for the treatment eﬀect on each subsample.
Reading: Being graded by the teacher increases the number of questions bought by 0.036 question. Being graded by
a male teacher increases the number of questions bought by 0.576 question.
***: Signiﬁcant at 1%. **: Signiﬁcant at 5%. *: Signiﬁcant at 10%.
This table reports the eﬀect of the non anonymous condition for each group of students and each group of teachers.
Coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst ﬁve rows are the coeﬃcients of separate regressions questionsi;t = Round 2i;t +Round 2
Treatmenti;t + ui + "i;t.









Eligible for Free Meals 0.238
( 0.390 )
Observations 290
Non Eligible for Free Meals 0.007
( 0.163 )
Observations 2,002
Each coeﬃcient comes from a separate regression for the treatment eﬀect on each subsample.
***: Signiﬁcant at 1%. **: Signiﬁcant at 5%. *: Signiﬁcant at 10%.
This table reports the eﬀect of the non anonymous condition for each group of students and each group of teachers.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 9: Comparing Grading Practices - The Teacher vs External Markers
Question Word pTeacher pExternal Examiner Diﬀerence p-value
1 customary 0.48 0.39 0.08 0.01
2 stone’s throw 0.36 0.33 0.03 0.30
3 wrestling 0.75 0.76 -0.01 0.71
4 earthquake 0.84 0.77 0.07 0.01
5 single 0.64 0.47 0.17 0.00
6 charisma 0.34 0.23 0.11 0.00
7 ﬁctional character 0.74 0.76 -0.02 0.63
8 legacy 0.43 0.47 -0.04 0.41
9 rhyme 0.63 0.52 0.11 0.02
10 curfew 0.52 0.45 0.07 0.17
Overall 0.57 0.52 0.06 0.06
pTeacher is the fraction of answers deemed right by the teacher. pExternalExaminer is the fraction
of answers deemed right by the external examiner. The p-value is the p-value of the t-test of the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 11: Treatment Eﬀect for Female Students graded by a Male Teacher




(Additional Number of Questions)
Good relationship with the teacher matters
More than the median student 0.801
( 0.442)*
Less than the median student 0.892
( 0.467)*
The advice and help of my teacher have played an important role in my progress
More than the median student 0.849
( 0.432)**
Less than the median student 0.834
( 0.482)*
Number of Observations 278
37Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire
Comparing Survey Questionnaire Answers and Students’ Choices
Survey questionnaire may substitute for the experiment if survey questionnaire answers are suﬃ-
ciently predictive of the number of questions purchased.
Table 12 shows the results of the regression of the number of questions bought on the answers
to the survey questionnaire. Each questionnaire answer except pocket money is coded from -1
(Strongly disagree) to +1 (Strongly agree). The answers predict 6% of the variance of the number
of questions bought. A perception that hard work determines success is positively correlated with
a larger number of questions bought. If the answer goes from 0 (Neither agree nor disagree) to
1 (Strongly agree), the number of questions bought increases by 0.768. A perception that luck
determines success is negatively correlated with the number of questions bought. This is likely
explained by the fact that a stated stronger role of luck increases the subjective variance of the
payoﬀ. If the answer goes from 0 (Neither agree nor disagree) to 1 (Strongly agree), the number of
questions bought goes down by 0.619 question. Similarly, a perception that ethnicities have equal
opportunities, or that a good relationship with the teacher matters is positively correlated with the
number of questions bought.
Pocket money is not correlated with the number of questions bought. Indeed, the eﬀect of
pocket money can theoretically increase or lower the marginal utility of money for the student:
higher amounts of pocket money may be correlated with higher income, or, on the contrary, may
be correlated with less parental investment in the child’s education.
38Table 12: Survey Questionnaire
Mean S.D. Min Max N
According to you, how important are the following in helping you to do well at school?
Luck 0.05 0.65 -1.00 1.00 633
Hard Work 0.82 0.31 -0.67 1.00 635
Good relationship with the teacher 0.33 0.52 -1.00 1.00 636
Do you think that pupils with the same ability
but diﬀerent ethnicities are equally likely to succeed at school?
Strongly disagree (-1) to Strongly agree (1) 0.68 0.50 -1.00 1.00 631
Do you think that, as a student, you are
Very weak (-1) to Good (1) 0.32 0.24 -0.67 1.00 631
Do you think your teachers expect you to do well at school?
Not at all (-1) to Yes very much (1) 0.68 0.40 -1.00 1.00 629
Sometimes my eﬀort at school is not given a proper reward
Strongly disagree (-1) to Strongly agree (1) 0.28 0.48 -1.00 1.00 633
The advice and help of my teacher have played an important role in my progress
Not at all (-1) to Yes very much (1) 0.50 0.45 -1.00 1.00 630
Pocket money per week 5.89 7.87 0.00 60.00 679
Each answer to the survey questionnaire except pocket money was coded from -1 (Strongly Disagree)
to +1 (Strongly Agree).
39Table 13: Correlations of Students’ Choice with the Answers to the Survey Questionnaire
Dependent variable: Questions
Hard work determines success 0.753
( 0.325)**
Luck determines success -0.579
( 0.144)***
Ethnicities have equal opportunities 0.567
( 0.190)***
Good relationship with the teacher matters 0.379
( 0.193)**
Advice of the teacher helped 0.285
( 0.229)
Thinks teacher has high expectations -0.437
( 0.255)*
Sometimes my eﬀort at school is not given a proper reward -0.445
( 0.191)**







Each answer to the survey questionnaire except pocket money was coded from -1 (Strongly Disagree)
to +1 (Strongly Agree). The grade 6 score is standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation
of 1. The dataset contains two choices per student and one survey questionnaire answer per student.
Thus, standard errors are clustered by student.
40Appendix B: Experimental Procedure
Detailed Timeline
1. We determine randomly which experimenters are assigned to which classroom.
2. Students are assigned a random number.
3. Students sit at the table corresponding to the number.
4. The presenter introduces the experiment to students.
5. Students answer the example deﬁnition.
6. The presenter gives one among many possible answers for the example deﬁnition.
First round
7. Students choose how many questions they would like to buy, from no question to 10 questions.
8. Once this choice is made, Students can open the envelope and have 20 minutes to provide
answers.
9. Envelopes are collected.
Second round
10. Students get a second envelope.
11. In the non anonymous group, the presenter states that questions will be corrected by their
teacher. Students conﬁrm that they know the teacher and are asked to conﬁrm the subject
that he/she teaches.
12. In the non anonymous group, students write down their name and their teacher’s name on
the envelope.
13. Students choose how many questions they would like to buy, from no question to 10 questions.
4114. Once this choice is made, students can open the envelope and have 20 minutes to write down
their answers.
15. Envelopes are collected.
16. Students can leave the classroom.
17. The teacher/the external marker grades the papers.
18. Payoﬀs are calculated and distributed in envelopes bearing the student’s number.
Instructions
Today we would like to conduct an experiment with you, where you have the opportunity to win
some real money. Over the next 90 minutes, we will ask you to complete two quizzes which are
based on the deﬁnitions of words. The more questions you answer correctly, the more money you
can win. I’d like you to relax, have fun and enjoy this experiment. I’m now going to explain what
you have to do. If you have any questions, please ask me at the end.
In front of you will see an instruction sheet for the game. We will give you £2 to start with
which you will use to take part in the quiz – you won’t see the actual money until the end of the 90
minute round. Inside the envelope there are 10 questions where you will be asked to deﬁne diﬀerent
words. If you want to answer a question – you will have to pay 20p to play. If you get it right, you
win 40p – so you double your money. If you get the question wrong, you don’t win anything, but
you forfeit the 20p you used to play. Remember – You’re only playing with the money we give you.
Let’s have a practice. On the instruction sheet, you’ll see the practice question: ‘Many people
from pirates to archaeologists – have devoted their lives to a quest. What is an archaeologist?’ Now
I’ll give you 2 minutes to have a go at this question – you must remain silent during these 2 minutes.
Remember that this is just a practice – no money will be awarded.
2 minutes
A deﬁnition could be ‘An archaeologist is somebody who studies past human societies such as
the things they built and the environment they lived in. An archaeologist may excavate sites and
recover evidence of past societies’.
42Now the real experiment will involve 10 separate questions like this and you will have 20 minutes
to answer them. At the end of the 20 minutes, the quiz will be marked anonymously – that means
that your name will not appear on the quiz sheet, but you can be identiﬁed by the number on your
desk. Please keep hold of this desk number as it identiﬁes you so you collect your winnings.
There is no clear-cut deﬁnition of the word, so a range of answers could be accepted.
To recap, in order to play, you will have to pay 20p per question. If you decide to answer all
10 questions and you answer them all correctly, you could win £4 – doubling your money. If you
get any questions wrong, you will forfeit the 20p you paid to answer it. You don’t have to answer
a question if you don’t want to. You will receive your winnings at the end of the experiment.
Now I’d like you to turn over the envelope and ﬁll in your desk number on the sheet and the
name of your teacher. You’ll see another example on the sheet about wrestling. At the bottom of
the sheet, you must choose how many questions you would like to answer – you can choose from 0
to 10. Please choose now.
In a moment, I’ll ask you to remove the quiz paper from the envelope and begin. You will have
20 minutes to answer the questions – and you must remain silent during these 20 minutes. I’ll give
you a warning when there are 5 minutes left.
You may now take out your quiz paper and begin. You have 20 minutes. Good luck.
20 minutes
Ask the young people to put the quiz back in the envelope and collect them all. Tell the young
people that the quizzes will now be marked and the results will be given at the end when they will
receive any winnings.
Hand out the envelopes again.
OK, now we are going to ask you to try a second quiz paper. Like last time, you will be given
10 questions on the deﬁnition of words and you will have 20 minutes to answer them.
I’m going to give you another £2 to play with – remember it costs 20p to answer each question
and you can win 40p for every correct answer. Please turn over the envelope and ﬁll in your desk
number and your teacher’s name. At the bottom of the sheet, you must choose how many questions
you would like to answer – you can choose from 0 to 10. Please choose now.
 Anonymous condition Again your paper will be marked anonymously – You must remain
43silent again from now on.
 Non Anonymous condition This time, your questions will be marked by your teacher. For
this reason I will ask you to ﬁll in your name instead of the desk number. You should also
give the name of your teacher. Your teacher will be able to assess your answer using his/her
knowledge of your vocabulary.
Please remove the quiz from inside the envelope. You have 20 minutes, I will warn you when there
are 5 minutes remaining - you may begin. Good luck.
20 minutes
Ask the young people to put the quiz back in the envelope and collect them all. Tell the young
people that the quizzes will now be marked and the results will be given at the end after the experi-
ment.
44